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Operation Delaware was a joint military operation launched during the Vietnam War. It began on Friday, April 19, 1968, with troops from the United States and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) moving into the A Shau Valley. The A Shau Valley was a vital corridor for moving military supplies coming from the Ho Chi Minh Trail and was used by the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) as a staging area for numerous attacks in northern I Corps. Other than small, special operations reconnaissance patrols, American and South Vietnamese forces had not been present in the region since the Battle of A Shau in 1966, when a U.S. Special Forces camp located there was overrun.〔Robert C. Ankony, ''Lurps: A Ranger's Diary of Tet, Khe Sanh, A Shau, and Quang Tri,'' revised ed., Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Lanham, MD (2009), pp.157–72.〕〔Tolson, John, Lt. Ge. Vietnam Studies Airmobility 1961-1971, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. (1973): 182-92.〕 ==Background== In January 1968, General Creighton W. Abrams, deputy commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, ordered the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) to move north from the Central Highlands to support the Marines. The 1st Cavalry Division, an airmobile division with 20,000 men and nearly 450 helicopters, had the most firepower and mobility of any division-size unit in Vietnam.〔 When it arrived in I Corps, the 1st Cavalry Division fought toe-to-toe with the enemy during the Tet Offensive. It was fully engaged with the PAVN at Khe Sanh when its commander, Maj. Gen. John J. Tolson, was ordered to prepare plans for the massive air assault into the A Shau Valley: Operation Delaware. After gaining control of the A Shau Valley in March 1966 the PAVN fortified it with powerful crew-served 37mm antiaircraft cannons, some of them radar controlled. They also had rapid firing twin-barreled 23mm cannons and many 12.7mm heavy machine guns to contribute to their air defenses. The A Shau Valley soon evolved into a major logistics depot for the PAVN, with storage locations often located in underground bunkers and tunnels. Because of this strength on the ground, and the relative geographic isolation of the valley, the U.S. and its allies conducted little offensive activity in the area except for air attacks, and those were limited by steep, mountainous terrain often cloaked under clouds and prone to sudden, violent changes in weather. Because of the very limited air mobility of the Marines in I Corps, no ground operations of any significance had been launched in the A Shau.〔〔Robert C. Ankony, "No Peace in the Valley," ''Vietnam'' magazine, Oct. 2008, pp. 26–31.〕 By early April 1968, the PAVN had just suffered casualties of more than 40,000 men in two major military campaigns: the Tet Offensive and at Khe Sanh.〔Robert Pisor, ''The End of the Line: The Siege of Khe Sanh.'' New York: W. W. Norton (1982), p. 181.〕 But the PAVN still had the ability to take the initiative in the northernmost part of I Corps. That ability came in part from isolated base areas like the sparsely populated A Shau Valley, running north-south along the Laotian border 30 miles south of Khe Sanh, where troops and supplies were moved into South Vietnam as the PAVN prepared for another battle — at a time and place of its choosing. The A Shau, a mile-wide bottomland flanked by densely forested 5,000-foot mountains, was bisected lengthwise by Route 548, a hard-crusted dirt road.〔 〔 〔 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Operation Delaware」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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